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GOVERNMENT SPEECH
ON UNSETTLED ISSUES
Abner S. Greene*
Government speaks either directly (e.g., public relations
campaigns) or indirectly (e.g., funding otherwise private speakers).
Does the Constitution restrict government speech? In a prior article,'
I argued that with some (important) limitations, government is free to
say what it wants and fund what speech it wants. Speech is not
regulation; at least it is not the kind of regulation that involves typical
governmental sanctions such as prison and fines. If government
speech neither coerces (as regulation does) nor creates a monopoly in
a given speech market, the Constitution is not implicated.
Here I would like to address one aspect of the government speech
problem, namely, the treatment of consensus versus controversy, of
the settled versus the unsettled. Here is how Cass Sunstein has
discussed the matter:
I say that viewpoint discrimination is "at least usually"
impermissible, because there will be some possible
counterexamples. Suppose, for example, that the government
decides to fund programs for the celebration and possible export of
democracy. Or suppose that it says that governmentally-funded
portrayals of the Civil War cannot advocate slavery. Or suppose
that it funds projects to discourage cigarette smoking or drug
addiction. For reasons to be explored shortly, viewpoint
discrimination of this kind may be acceptable in some circumstances.
Government may be permitted to discriminate on the basis of point
of view if (1) it is doing so in the context of sharply limited, discrete
initiatives and (2) the viewpoint discrimination does not involve
taking sides in a currently contested political debate. For example,
it seems clear that a fund for democracy may permissibly promote
democratic causes. Perhaps this is so because democracy has come
to be understood [FN 16] as a sufficiently shared, sufficiently
nonpartisan goal as to escape the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. Similarly, [an] anticigarette campaign may
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. Yale University, 1982; J.D.
University of Michigan, 1986.
1. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L Rev. 1 (2000).
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legitimately fund people who will campaign against cigarette
smoking; the government need not also fund people who approve of
smoking. But these are unusual cases. Most across-the-board laws
containing viewpoint discrimination would be impossible to justify.
FN16. The word "understood" shows the problem: the approval of
democracy is a form of viewpoint discrimination even if there is
everything to be said on behalf of the viewpoint being approved.'
One can readily agree with Sunstein's major premise, that
viewpoint discrimination is almost always unconstitutional. But
Sunstein uses the term "viewpoint discrimination" in a way I find
troubling and draws a distinction between government funding in
contested versus uncontested areas of social policy that cannot
withstand further analysis. On the use of "viewpoint discrimination":
the word "discrimination" stacks the deck. It is often used to mean
invalid regulatory treatment of x, y, or z (e.g., on the basis of race, or
gender, or viewpoint). But the validity of the criterion in question is
the issue, and should not be assumed away through use of the label
"discrimination." And whether government funding, as opposed to
regulation, on the basis of viewpoint should ever be deemed
"viewpoint discrimination" is also the issue, and also should not be
assumed away definitionally.
The key issue here, though, is not co-opting the argument through
use of the term "viewpoint discrimination." Rather, it is the operative
distinction Sunstein draws between (a) taking sides in a currently
contested political debate and (b) advancing a sufficiently shared,
sufficiently nonpartisan goal. Sunstein concludes that government
funding that does the former is constitutionally invalid, while
government funding that does the latter is permissible. This
distinction, however, represents an improper move from an accurate
descriptive observation to an indefensible normative conclusion. The
accurate descriptive observation is that when government speaks on
matters that appear settled, government does not appear to be
favoring a particular viewpoint, and its speech is not likely to stir up
trouble. Similarly, it is accurate to observe that when government
speaks on matters that appear contested, government does seem to be
favoring a particular viewpoint, and its speech is likely to cause a
firestorm. But even combining these two factors-government speech
in a contested area appears viewpoint-based and is likely to add to
discord-does not lead to the separate and much more complex
normative conclusion of unconstitutionality.
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 229, 231-32, 305
n.16 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democracy]. An earlier version of these
arguments, less well developed, appears in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution
311,313 (1993).
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I first show that the distinction between the settled and the
unsettled has important analogues in areas of law other than
government speech. I try to synthesize, as a descriptive matter, the
various appearances of the settled/unsettled distinction and give
ground on the claim that government action in unsettled areas can
often be irksome. But there is a major is-ought problem here, and I
attempt to show that the normative claims that often follow from the
observation that an area is unsettled are claims that cannot stand.
The distinction between the settled and the unsettled appears often
throughout American law. The common thread is this: Government,
as a conduit for the people, appropriately represents the people in
areas of great social consensus. But in unsettled areas, where the
people are transparently divided, government has little or no role, for
it does not have interests of its own, and can only represent the
people's interests, which are indiscernible if the people are divided.
Here are three areas in which this distinction is manifest: certain
theories of judicial review, based in aspects of Marshall's opinion in
Marbury3 and most prominent in Thayerian notions of judicial
restraint;4 differential responses to invocations of science versus
invocations of policy in administrative law; and government speech.
In each instance, government is seen as acting appropriately when
funneling what's just out there, what's accepted, what's given, what's
taken for granted, but as acting inappropriately and often beyond
constitutional authority or in otherwise ultra vires fashion when
entering a controversy and resolving it, or when upsetting what
appears settled. The deep sense here is that government is a
necessary evil. If only the people could achieve their desires in an
unmediated fashion, with full consent and no compromise and no
representation; in such a prelapsarian world, there would be no room
for dissensus. Although we don't live in Eden, government is
nonetheless seen, perhaps dimly, as most legitimate when the least
mediated. Government action that carries out the clear will of the
people is easy to defend; government action that upsets such will, or
seeks to create it out of babel, is something else indeed.
But as I will try to show, this view of government is naive (although
charmingly so). It fails to see government as part of discord, as a
participant in both unsettling and the unsettled. It elevates the dream
of the unum-e pluribus unurn, out of many, one-over the reality of
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
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the e pluribus-the many we are and will be.5 And when applied to
government speech, this view becomes oddly associated with a certain
form of liberalism; political liberals, New Deal liberals, who otherwise
support government action in many arenas, get very antsy when
government uses its speech power to advance contested views of the
good. These liberals, I argue, should calm down.
Judicial review, both in theory and practice, has been dominated by
the distinction between the settled and the unsettled, the taken for
granted and the up for grabs. Larry Lessig has described the
phenomenon well:
By "contested" I mean a discourse where fundamentals in that
discourse appear up for grabs; that participants in that discourse
acknowledge the legitimacy of disagreement about these
fundamentals; that disagreement is a sign of normalcy for a
participant, not oddness.
An uncontested discourse is much the opposite. Here people don't,
in the main, disagree about fundamentals. In the main, they don't
think much about fundamentals at all. People act, or argue, instead,
taking these fundamentals for granted. Life here is normal science.6
That describes the phenomenon. Here is what comes of it: "About
the contestable, judges can say nothing; about the uncontested, judges
can say only one thing."7  What Lessig is tracking-the
inappropriateness of judges doing politics, the appropriateness of
judges carrying out understandings that appear to come already-
made-has deep roots. As far back as Marbury, I want to argue.
Two aspects of Marbury are important here. The first is Marshall's
invention of the political question doctrine. The second is Marshall's
mention of appropriate cases for judicial invalidation of statutes.
Together, we see an early and influential example of the distinction
between the settled and the unsettled and the unease with which the
latter is viewed. First, on political questions: Recall that Marbury's
commission as justice of the peace had been signed but never
delivered. He sued Madison, then Secretary of State, to receive the
commission, pursuant to a law authorizing such suits directly in the
Supreme Court. The Court, of course, held that Congress lacked the
power to authorize such suits. But before reaching that question (and
5. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
6. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365, 1393
(1997).
7. Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a
Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 Geo. L.J. 1837, 1846-47 (1997).
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the most well-known portion of the opinion), Marshall first
determined that Marbury had a right to the commission and then
turned to the question whether the laws of the country afforded him a
remedy. Here he began developing the political question doctrine.
He wrote: "Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be
considered as a mere political act, belonging to the executive
department alone, for the performance of which entire confidence is
placed by our constitution in the supreme executive; and for any
misconduct respecting which, the injured individual has no remedy?""
And a bit later:
By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in
his political character and to his own conscience. To aid him in the
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be
used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that
discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not
individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive, the decision
of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the
president. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated.
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by
the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts;
when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of
those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws
for his conduct; and cannot, at his discretion, sport away the vested
rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,
merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases
in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.9
& Marbury, 5 U.S. at 164.
9. Id. at 165-66.
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Courts play a proper role in enforcing settled understandings of
legal duties; other powers are granted to government without specific
restriction by rule, and those powers are not judicially examinable;
they are, in other words, merely political. Those powers deal with
matters unsettled. In the very next section of the opinion, Marshall
discussed the nature of the writ (mandamus), and asked whether the
officer against whom the writ is directed (Madison, the Secretary of
State) may be hauled into court in this type of matter. Such would be
improper if Marbury were asking Madison to perform a discretionary
function in one way or another, but proper if asking for the carrying
out of a specified legal duty. Marshall wrote, echoing the earlier
passage: "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights
of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted
to the executive, can never be made in this court."'" Marbury's
commission, it turns out, did not involve such political discretion. So
although in the early portions of the opinion Marshall ruled again and
again for Marbury, deeming the commission his vested right and
mandamus against Madison a (generally) appropriate remedy, he
slipped in (all dicta) the important distinction between the role of the
courts in enforcing settled legal rights and the required abstinence of
the courts in matters discretionary, political, or one might say,
unsettled.
When Marshall turned to his discussion of judicial review (and
established the power of the Court to invalidate unconstitutional
legislation), he first made the easier point that the Constitution
trumps inconsistent statutes and then turned to the harder question of
whether the courts have the power to make such a determination of
inconsistency. He offered various arguments: that it is a court's role
to say what the law is; that therefore courts must interpret all law and
rule in cases of conflict between one source of law and another; that
without judicial review legislatures would have a kind of omnipotence,
and thus that judicial review serves as an important check on
legislative overreaching; and that in some cases (cycling back to his
point about inconsistency of two sources of law) "the constitution
must be looked into by the judges."" At this point (just before
making an argument from the judicial oath), Marshall stated: "There
are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this
subject."' 2 What follows is what I shall call his easy cases list:
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton,
of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought
10. Id. at 170.
11. Id. at 179.
12. Id.
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judgment to be rendered in such a case? [O]ught the judges to close
their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law[?]
The constitution declares "that no bill of attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed."
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be
prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims
whom the constitution endeavours to preserve?
"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court."
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to
the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to
be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and
declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for
conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative
act?
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is
apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that
instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the
legislature.13
Contrast this discussion with the earlier passages about political
questions. Here are Marshall's easy case examples for judicial
invalidation, for rights clearly established by the Constitution for
which no argument for deference to politics shall be heard. These are,
in other words, the examples of courts enforcing settled
understandings; none of the examples is a hard case in which the court
is asked to enforce a right of murky contour; all are cases in which the
reader is expected to assent without question, murmuring, "well of
course the court must step in here, there's no politics involved, no
mucking around in unsettled, discretionary waters, just the
enforcement of the clear will of the people as expressed through the
Constitution." Of course the hard work is in determining when one is
looking at an easy case, and when a hard one. But for present
purposes, the distinction drawn in Marbury between political
questions and easy cases is the distinction between the controversial
and the settled.
One way of mapping the connection between the settled/unsettled
distinction in judicial review and in government speech is to suggest
that it directly favors my argument for a robust role for government
speech. In judicial review, courts enforce readings that are settled, but
leave to politics matters that are unsettled. Similarly, one could say,
13. Id. at 179-80.
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politics is the place to resolve unsettled issues in the government
speech area as well.
The mapping seems wrong to me, however. One has to work here
by analogy, rather than directly. The distinction between settled and
unsettled in judicial review is about keeping the forum for principle -
the courts-away from the griminess of politics. In the government
speech arena, the distinction also separates a forum for principle-
where the settled may be advanced-from a forum for politics-where
dissensus rules. But in the government speech arena, government
generally is often seen as the forum for principle, and private speech is
seen as the forum for politics. There is something pristine about
government simply carrying out the consensus mandate (the "Just Say
No to Drugs" campaign, for example), but something seen as unruly
when government steps into the muck of politics. The muck of
politics, in judicial review theory generally, is precisely the
government's terrain; but that same arena of discord is viewed as
inappropriate when what's at stake are competing speech positions
about a controversial topic. There, government should step back, it is
argued, and let the private sector arguments hash things out.
** *
When courts review agency action, they often draw the following
line (though not always explicitly): If the agency has relied on policy
considerations in fleshing out an otherwise vague statute, the court
will defer to policy; 4 if the agency has relied on science or other
technical expertise in fleshing out an otherwise vague statute, the
court will ensure that the science is valid and then will defer to the
scientific claim. Although in the latter instance the role of the court is
more intrusive than in the former (and for good reason: in the former
case, the agency is willing to take the policy heat; in the latter, it is
passing the buck to technical claims), the court is still, even in the
science setting, ultimately deferring to an outside authority. Whether
the authority is that of the unruly world of politics or the more tidy
world of scientists and technocrats, the court never assumes power
itself, i.e., it never announces what it thinks the vague statute should
mean. This posture of avoiding responsibility is similar to the judicial
review posture I have described above, where courts prefer either to:
(a) rely on settled understandings, or what appear to be easy cases, for
invalidating the action of another branch, or to (b) defer to the
maelstrom of politics. The analogue to the government speech setting
is this: many scholars (the Sunstein position et al.) are vastly more
comfortable with government simply implementing decisions that
14. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
45,865-66 (1984).
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seem easy, settled, and backgrounded (e.g., Just Say No), and become
very uncomfortable when government appears to be stepping into a
hot-button social issue, even if using its powers of persuasion only.
Such action (even though legislative, and not judicial, as my judicial
review and administrative law examples are) presents the relevant
governmental actor as distorting an arena in which government is
better left as implementer only. I shall argue later that this is the
wrong way to look at government speech on controversial issues.
In the administrative law setting, I want to focus on two opinions by
Justice Scalia, helping to draw the line between agency reliance on
policy and agency reliance on science. In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson
Scientific, Inc.,' the Court upheld the NLRB's refusal to presume that
replacement workers oppose an incumbent union. The Court allowed
the NLRB to continue its relatively new practice of case-by-case
assessment of the sentiments of replacement workers. Justice Scalia
characterized the question differently: whether in the case at hand the
NLRB had substantial evidence for its conclusion that the employer
had not established a reasonable good-faith doubt as to the union's
majority status. Of interest here is the way Scalia challenged the
majority's reasoning. It is one thing, he wrote, for an agency to rely
on a presumption of law, that is, for the agency to declare that, as a
policy matter, it would conclusively presume certain things to be true.
Thus, the NLRB perhaps could have declared, as a matter of policy,
that it would presume nothing about whether replacement workers
support the incumbent union. But, said Scalia, the NLRB did not so
declare. Rather, it relied on an inference, i.e., a presumption of fact,
by stating that as a matter of logic and reasoning, there is no inference
to be drawn about whether replacement workers support the union.
And that, said Scalia, is challengeable as any statement of logic and
reasoning is challengeable, and (he concluded) it is wrong.
The key point for our purposes is that, according to Scalia, courts
should defer to agencies if the agencies come clean and make explicit
policy moves (so long as Congress has not otherwise forbidden the
policy choice in question). But courts may not defer to agencies if the
agencies are relying on science or other technical expertise. In such
settings, agencies are either: (a) actually relying on science, which
should be subject to any relevant scientific test (or other test of
reason), or (b) relying on science as a mask, under which is really a
policy choice. Thus, Scalia wrote: "[The Board]... has chosen-
unlike any other major agency of the Federal Government-to make
almost all its policy through adjudication. It is entitled to do [so], but
it is not entitled to disguise policymaking as factfinding, and thereby
15. 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
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to escape the legal and political limitations to which policymaking is
subject. 16
In a subsequent labor case, Scalia won a majority for holding an
agency to the logic of its reasoning process if it was not explicitly
claiming authority based on policy. Allentown Mack Sales and
Service, Inc. v. NLRB 17 held first, that the NLRB did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously by requiring employers to show good-faith
reasonable doubt about a union's majority support before either
conducting an internal poll of employee support for the union,
requesting Board-supervised elections, or unilaterally withdrawing
recognition. Next, the Court held that on the facts of the case,
management had reasonable, good-faith grounds to doubt the union's
retention of majority support, and that the NLRB lacked substantial
evidence for its conclusion to the contrary. The Board argued,
however, that it had developed a practice of discounting certain sorts
of employee testimony on the subject of union support and was
rejecting such evidence (here favoring management) accordingly. In
response, Scalia for the Court wrote:
Of course, the Board is entitled to be skeptical about the employer's
claimed reliance on secondhand reports when the reporter has little
basis for knowledge, or has some incentive to mislead. But that is a
matter of logic and sound inference from all the circumstances, not
an arbitrary rule of disregard to be extracted from prior Board
decisions. 8
The NLRB had claimed that its precedent established such
skepticism, but Scalia responded that its stated standards remained
more favorable to management. (That is, management can have
good-faith doubt about a union's majority status even by relying
heavily on the testimony of interested employees.) Had the Board
changed its standards in clear fashion, with the public on notice that a
policy change was happening, that could have been upheld. But by
announcing more pro-management standards and then seeking to
apply more pro-labor principles case by case, the Board had, in effect,
sought to avoid policy scrutiny. Thus, its conclusions must be
examined case by case to see if they meet the substantial evidence
test, and in this case they did not. Again, for Scalia, courts should
defer to politics if it is clear that politics has happened; 9 otherwise the
authority of science (including logic, reasoning, inferences from facts)
takes over, and the deference is to what is settled (i.e., understood as
authoritative) in that arena.
16. Id. at 819.
17. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
18. Id. at 379.
19. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the
Court should defer to agency's regulatory decision as a matter of politics).
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In both areas discussed-judicial review and administrative law-
the settled/unsettled line represents a kind of discomfort with
government as proactive. Government, seen thus as a necessary evil
(wouldn't things be better if unmediated? if desires didn't have to be
filtered and compromised and re-presented?), is best off
implementing decisions already made (the easy cases from Marbttry
that the Court should enforce; the administrative law deference to
policy, while challenging science on science's terms only). Whether
the branch of government is the judiciary or the executive,
government does best when it is seen as doing least. The analogy in
the area of free speech scholarship on government speech is the easy
acceptance of government promotion of settled ideas, with the
accompanying discomfort when such speech enters an arena of
current social contest. Here the branch in question is the legislature,
and even though the legislature is otherwise seen as the appropriate
branch for policy squabbles (seen as such in Marbury's discussion of
political questions and in the various administrative law deference
doctrines), when it comes to government promotion of contested
notions of the good, even the legislature is too much government and
not enough immediacy. Immediacy, that is, involves funneling
accepted and settled notions (Just Say No); but using government
funds to advance a controversial argument (no abortion counseling-"
or no indecent arte') cannot be seen as funneling the people's desires
in a smooth way and thus is seen as problematic.
I have already set forth Cass Sunstein's arguments on this. He is
not alone, though, and it is helpful to see how much support he has.
Elena Kagan suggests that perhaps government funding that warns of
the dangers of tobacco would be permissible (without funding the
tobacco companies' message). She writes that "the debate in this case,
by its nature, offers the hope of right and wrong answers-answers
subject to verification and proof," that "society has reached a shared
consensus on the issue; the answers, in addition to being verifiable, are
widely believed," and that, most importantly, "one side of the debate
appears to do great harm."" Other scholars have delineated a similar
line between the settled and the unsettled, by focusing on whether
20. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). I discuss in the text the majority
view in the scholarly community against viewpoint-based government funding and
therefore opposed to the outcome in Rust.
21. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). See supra note 20 for an explanation
of scholarly community versus caselaw.
22. Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992
Sup. Ct. Rev. 29,75.
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government speech would alter the nature of a speech forum or would
be consonant with extant understandings of the forum. 3 David Cole
writes:
Where neutrality is consistent with such an institution's function,
strict neutrality should be required; where some non-neutral content
decisions must be made, the first amendment should guarantee a
degree of independence for the decision-maker. Where, on the
other hand, the institution does not play an important role in
furthering public dialogue or individual autonomy, or where non-
neutral government speech is necessary to further an important
government function or first amendment values, government should
be free to support speech non-neutrally. By requiring neutrality and
independence in certain spheres of government funding and
allowing departures from neutrality in others, the first amendment
can structurally accommodate the inherently contradictory values
and dangers of government-funded speech on an institution-by-
institution rather than case-by-case basis.2 4
Robert Post argues, in analogous fashion: "[T]he allocation of
speech to managerial domains is a question of normative
characterization.... [S]uch restrictions on speech can be justified
only where those occupying the relevant social space actually inhabit
roles that are defined by reference to an instrumental logic." 5 The
normal understanding of the doctor-patient relationship, explains
Post, includes an openness of discourse and an independence of
medical judgment; the Court was wrong to treat the abortion
counseling gag rule at issue in Rust as within a managerial domain. 6
Post acknowledges that this relationship may be in fact altered within
a particular setting (such as Title X); such alteration is unusual,
though, and the "Court offers no evidence to support its claim that it
has occurred within Title X clinics." 27 He further acknowledges that
the government may create special clinics in which special roles are
clearly manifested, i.e., physicians are in fact state employees; this is
permitted under the first amendment. "What the First Amendment
forbids is the attempt to hire what all concerned understand to be
physicians and then to attempt to regulate their speech as though they
were merely employees. '2 8
The Cole and Post discussions are similar to the Sunstein and
Kagan ones in the following way: Sunstein and Kagan explicitly point
to whether an issue is settled, noncontroversial (government speech
okay), or whether the issue is a matter of current social contest
23. For further discussion on this point, see Greene, supra note 1, at 52-67.
24. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675,716 (1992).
25. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 171 (1996).
26. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
27. Post, supra note 25, at 173-74 n. 127.
28. Id. at 174 n.128.
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(government speech supporting one side only not okay). Cole and
Post point to whether current social understandings of the speech
forum in question support government speech in a restricted fashion;
if so, the speech may continue. Such forums are the analogy of the
settled/noncontroversial in the Sunstein/Kagan argument. Cole and
Post point, on the contrary, to government speech that seeks to
disrupt extant forum understandings (Cole: is the forum understood
now as neutral or not? Post: are the actors in the relevant social
space now actually inhabiting certain roles or not?). Such speech is
impermissible, they say.
In other words, government, here represented by the legislature, is
most defensible when carrying out the already understood and
accepted, and the least defensible when shaking up understandings.
We have seen the same structure of concern with the courts in
Marbury (the easy case list versus questions by their nature political)
and with agencies in administrative law doctrine (judicial hands-off
regarding matters understood as policy).
How are we to understand this overarching comfort with the settled
and discomfort with the unsettled, regarding government speech?
One answer is purely prudential: Government will do better and
society will be more stable if government stays out of social messes.
Joseph Raz puts it this way:
The pursuit of full-blooded perfectionist policies, even of those
which are entirely sound and justified, is likely, in many countries if
not in all, to backfire by arousing popular resistance leading to civil
strife. In such circumstances compromise is the order of the day.
There is no abstract doctrine which can delineate what the terms of
the compromise should be. All one can say is that it will confine
perfectionist measures to matters which command a large measure
of social consensus, and it will further restrict the use of coercive and
of greatly confining measures and will favour gentler measures
favouring one trend or another.29
But what of arguments from principle? What arguments are there
that government may not, as a matter of either first amendment
understanding or political theory, put its speech powers behind one
side or another in a matter of current social contest?
The constitutional argument is that such government speech is
viewpoint discrimination, as bad here as it is in regulatory actions.
This extrapolation of concerns over viewpoint discrimination from the
regulatory setting to the speech setting is a poor one, however.' Why
is viewpoint discrimination problematic? Geoffrey Stone writes that
"the first amendment is concerned, not only with the extent to which a
law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also-and
29. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 429 (1986).
30. For a related discussion, see Greene, supra note 1, at 31.40.
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perhaps even more fundamentally-with the extent to which the law
distorts public debate."31 Suppressing a viewpoint amounts to "an
effective prohibition on the expression of [one's] view. '32  It
"mutilates 'the thinking process of the community."' 33 In addition,
such restrictions display governmental disapproval of certain
messages, reflecting government partiality. 4 Elena Kagan agrees that
viewpoint regulation is the worst form of content-based regulation,
because it "skews public debate in a way a general ban (or refusal to
subsidize) would not and because it more likely arises from an
impermissible motive."'35
Viewpoint discrimination-take as a paradigm an ordinance
permitting speech favoring the incumbent administration while
banning speech opposing the incumbent administration-is indeed
deeply problematic. But it is important here to distinguish between
regulation and government speech. When government criminalizes
the expression of a particular point of view, is the concern that the
government has come out for the opposing point of view? Or is the
concern that the threat of criminal sanctions will effectively silence
certain speakers (of the criminalized viewpoint), undercutting
individual autonomy and thereby distorting debate? If the
government says "we favor viewpoint x, but you may continue to
express viewpoint y all you want, without fear of criminal sanctions,"
has it not done something quite different? The first difference is that
government speech advances a viewpoint in debate, while regulatory
restrictions do not. Secondly, to the extent that freedom of speech is
concerned with protecting self-expression as a core element of
personhood, with protecting autonomy, criminal sanctions on a
particular viewpoint are vastly more inhibiting than government
speech supporting the opposing viewpoint. To the extent that
freedom of speech is concerned with ensuring an open marketplace
for speech and with ensuring democracy through open channels of
debate and protest, criminal sanctions on a particular viewpoint are
much more likely than government speech favoring the opposing
viewpoint to create a highly distorted marketplace or an ill-
functioning democracy. Government speech supporting viewpoint x,
while allowing viewpoint y to exist (but without government support),
leaves the marketplace open (unless the government speech creates a
monopoly3 6 or coerces citizen choice37) and leaves room for dissent in
31. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 189, 198 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46,54-
57 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 103 (1978).
35. Kagan, supra note 22, at 67.
36. See Greene, supra note 1, at 27-40.
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the political process. Moreover, government speech may, by playing a
role (but not the only role) in a given speech market, expand that
market, making it more robust.
In short, viewpoint discrimination is a term that we should leave for
government regulation of a particular viewpoint. We should not use it
to describe government speech favoring a given viewpoint. Such
speech, absent monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism concerns,38
should be considered a healthy part of the market and of democratic
debate and as no intrusion on the liberty or autonomy of citizens to
express contrary viewpoints.
So we have rejected two possible arguments for allowing
government speech on settled issues only. The modus vivendi
argument-that greater stability is achieved when government stays
out of social controversy-has its place, but not as an anchor for a
principle of either constitutional law or political theory. The
viewpoint discrimination argument-that government support for one
side over another in a currently contested social matter violates the
first amendment-advances a point of principle, but as we have seen,
the point should be rejected. What remains, I think, is a deeper
argument about the proper role of government in a liberal democracy.
Let's look again at some of Lessig's work to see how such an
argument is set up descriptively and cashed out normatively.
Lessig writes that the force of social meanings "hangs upon their
resting upon a certain uncontested, or taken-for-granted, background
of thought or expectation-alternatively, that though constructed,
their force depends upon them not seeming constructed.-39 In other
words:
When these understandings or expectations become uncontested
and invisible, social meanings derived from them appear natural, or
necessary. The more they appear natural, or necessary, or
uncontested, or invisible, the more powerful or unavoidable or
natural social meanings drawn from them appear to be. The
converse is also true: the more contested or contingent, the less
powerful meanings appear to be.40
If one accepts this description-that the more meanings appear
contested, the less powerful they are-then what follows also makes
sense. That is:
[E]fforts by the government to regulate social meaning that are seen
37. See iL at 41-49.
38. Ventriloquism involves government speech, either directly or through funding
conditions, that masks the fact that government is the source of the speech. This is
problematic, but should not be a sufficient ground for constitutional invalidation. For
discussion, see id. at 49-52.
39. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L Rev. 943,
951 (1995).
40. Id. at 960-61.
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as efforts by the government to change social meaning will be less
effective than efforts that are not so viewed.... [T]here is a strong
incentive for the government to deliver its message of change while
hiding the messenger.... [G]overnment will have an incentive to
[ minimize] the extent to which its messages seeking change seem to
be messages from it, by tying its messages to independent authorities
(for example, doctors) or authority (science).41
The descriptive point migrates into a normative one. Settled
understandings are more powerful than contested ones, and if
government is seeking to engage in speech activity, and wants to be
effective, it will try to make the arguments seem not contested, and
one way to do this is to make the argument seem that of science (and
settled) rather than that of policy (and unruly). I have dubbed this
sort of masking "ventriloquism" and have argued that when
government engages in speech it should come clean and reveal its role
in the debate.4 Government may have an incentive to avoid this, but
it is not an incentive conducive to accountable democratic
governance. If the cost of coming clean is that more social meanings
will be seen as contested and thus harder to instantiate as science,
then so be it. Again, this is not an argument against governmental
intrusion into contested social debates; it's just an acknowledgment
that the efforts at persuasion may be hampered by revealing that (a)
the government is involved and (b) the issue is contested.
Lessig proceeds from the descriptive claim about the relative power
of seemingly settled social meaning, and the quasi-normative
discussion about masking, to a clearly normative concern with
government speech. He writes:
[C]ensorship is just one part of any power over orthodoxy.... [W]e
might worry when institutions, whether government or private,
exercise significant market power.... This might.., suggest a
greater anxiety about governmental speech.... [Tihe proscription
of speech is just one of many means to the establishment of
orthodoxy-indeed, perhaps the least effective way. What the
techniques of social meaning regulation reveal is that there are many
ways for government to establish what is orthodox and what is
heretical, speech proscription being just one. Yet for these other
techniques, the First Amendment has nothing to say.43
On the last point, others disagree. There is clearly a body of
scholarship that places first amendment limits on government
speech."a To the extent that such speech monopolizes a speech market
41. Id. at 1017-18.
42. See Greene, supra note 1, at 49-52.
43. Lessig, supra note 39, at 1036, 1037, 1039, 1041.
44. See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many
Uses of State Power 107 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 45-48
(1996); Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 2, at 115, 231; Cole, supra note 24, at 743;
Kagan, supra note 22, at 67; Post, supra note 25, at 173-74; Martin H. Redish & Daryl
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or coerces citizen choice, I agree that the first amendment comes into
play 5 But Lessig's normative concern exists even without such
showings, and even without invoking the first amendment. As a
matter of political principle, government power backing some
viewpoints over others seems problematic because government
"establish[ment]" of accepted views, or meanings, seems contrary to
core American understandings of the limited power of government.
I could not agree more with the major premise: that government
establishment or prescription of ideas is invalid. But it is far too easy,
it seems to me, to assume that government participation in contested
social debates has the effect of establishing or prescribing ideas. That
government in a liberal democracy must leave ample space for diverse
expression, for dissent, for wide-ranging debate, is a no-brainer. That
government in a liberal democracy must remove itself from such
debates is, it seems to me, a much harder position to defend. The
argument seems to be-from Lessig as well as from the others I have
discussed and cited-that even if government is not monopolizing a
speech market, or coercing citizen choice, or ventriloquizing, it still
exerts an overly powerful force on debate, and too great a risk of the
pall of government-prescribed orthodoxy is present. Government
support for already accepted orthodoxy-Just Say No, etc.-is often
perceived as perfectly legitimate, however. Taking sides in a
contested debate-such as the abortion debate or the debate about
indecent art-is seen as highly problematic. The concern Lessig
expresses with governmental "establish[ment]" of social meaning is
shared by the other scholars precisely at those moments when
government is seen most clearly as trying to tip the balance in a hot
area, not when it is seen as merely playing out what has already been
decided. Leaving aside the first amendment doctrinal analogue of this
concern (viewpoint discrimination, which I have discussed earlier), the
point of liberal democratic theory seems to be that government should
not appear to be adding its weight to one side or the other of a debate.
But it is exactly this point that I want to contest. It seems to me a
mistaken understanding of liberal democratic theory to extend the
concept of "neutrality" this far. Liberal democratic government is not
and has not been relegated to that of night watchman, or even that of
funnel of the people's desires. Especially in the post-New Deal era,
government does much more. There are several ways of
understanding government's contribution as speaker.46 First: Some
government speech serves as a public good; the production of some
art and information might lag were it not for government suppport.
Second: Government speech can serve as an avenue for the
I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L Rev. 543, 576, 580
(1996).
45. See Greene, supra note 1, at 26-49.
46. For further discussion, see id. at 8-12.
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representation of citizens' higher-minded desires even when as
consumers they act with perhaps lower-minded motives (the smoker
who supports Surgeon General's warnings against smoking, the
careless litterer who supports environmental recycling campaigns,
etc.). Third: Government can use its speech powers to alter social
norms that might be difficult for people to alter through private
action. Fourth: We might develop a theory of moral responsibility to
suggest that government has an obligation to try to persuade toward
its view of the good. If person X has a duty of care toward person Y,
and person X believes that a certain view on an issue relevant to
person Y's well-being is the best view, then perhaps person X has a
duty of straightforwardness on that issue to person Y. Might we not
say that government has a similar duty to the citizens? Government's
conceptions of the good might not simply mirror a clear consensus of
the populace, but so long as government is one speaker among many
and is not coercing citizen choice, why should we deem government
speech "establishment" or "regulation" or "imposition"?47 We trust
the people to distinguish good arguments from bad ones all the time;
indeed, this is one of the principal defenses of a strong free speech
clause. Why can't we trust the very same population to weed out bad
governmental arguments from good ones?
In short, if there is an argument from principle against government
speech on contested issues apart from concerns about monopoly,
coercion, and ventriloquism, it must be an argument resting in a
neutrality theory of liberal democracy. But government speech on
contested issues need not be seen as violating the core of neutrality.
The settled/controversial distinction has deep roots in our law. I have
discussed two areas in which government replication of what appears
settled ruffles no feathers, but government "intervention" into the
unsettled appears problematic. Whether or not these distinctions
make sense in the areas of judicial review and administrative law
(questions I will pass on here), the distinction leads us astray when
thinking about government speech. Government speech on unsettled
issues might appear nonneutral and accordingly less defensible. But
this only converts to an argument from principle if we rely on a
conception of government as carrying forth common ground, as the
repository of our desire to overcome difference. Government, no less
than any other social institution, is more unruly than that. It is a place
47. The establishment clause of the first amendment should be understood as
placing restrictions on governmental religious speech, restrictions that do not extend
to governmental secular speech. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of
Religion, in Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed.,
2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
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not only for struggle toward a common end, but also for uncommon
struggles that never end.48
As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided an
important case about conditional speech limitations in government
funding programs. The Legal Services Corporation ("LSC")
distributes federal money for the legal representation of indigent
persons in civil matters. Congress enacted a provision forbidding LSC
representation in cases that "involve an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the
representation. '49 The specific concern was with use of federal funds
to litigate welfare reform issues.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, invalidated this funding
condition, in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez. -' The opinion,
by Justice Kennedy, offered various grounds for the holding. First,
the Court distinguished Rust v. Sullivan,5' in which it had upheld
speech restrictions in a family planning funding program, specifically
forbidding abortion counseling or referral by health care providers
receiving federal funds. The Velazquez Court said that the
"counseling activities of the doctors... amounted to governmental
speech," 2 and thus the government could restrict the speech to its
favored viewpoint. The LSC program was designed "to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message."" That is, an
LSC-funded lawyer "speaks on the behalf of the client," and "is not
the government's speaker."' The leeway that government has in
advancing its own message disappears when it is funding speech not
attributable to government.
Second, although the Court acknowledged that government often
establishes limited purpose speech forums, either physical in nature or
via funding, it may not "distort [the] usual functioning 5 5 of a
particular type of expression. Here, that means Congress may not
"distort[] the legal system by altering the traditional role of...
attorneys,' 56 which the LSC funding restrictions would do by
removing a type of argument from a funded attorney's legal options.
48. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues
293 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism
by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 646
(1994).
49. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, slip op. at 3 (Feb. 28,2001).
50. Slip op. (Feb. 28,2001).
51. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
52- Velazquez, slip op. at 6.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id
55. Id. at 8; see also id at 9.
56. Id at 10.
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Third, the Court was concerned that although the indigent women
in Rust could get abortion-related advice from other sources, the
indigent clients in Velazquez would often have "no alternative
source ... to receive vital information respecting constitutional and
statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits."57
Fourth, the Court noted that the funding restriction "operates to
insulate current welfare laws from constitutional scrutiny and certain
other legal challenges, a condition implicating central First
Amendment concerns."58 In other words, the restriction "is designed
to insulate the Government's interpretation of the Constitution from
judicial challenge. 59
Although Velazquez was correctly decided, the opinion is
overwritten, and the second ground for the holding, in particular, is
problematic. As I suggested in my prior piece on government speech,
the LSC funding condition at issue in Velazquez is unconstitutional
because it blocks the path of legal change.' Following the classic
Carolene Products footnote 4,61 and John Hart Ely's elaboration on
the theme,62 government may not block avenues of challenge to itself,
and that is precisely what the Velazquez funding condition does. That
is the Court's fourth ground for its holding, and it would have been
sufficient.
The third ground also touches on a proper concern in the setting of
government funding of speech. If government pushes a particular
point of view, and other viewpoints are available in the same speech
forum, then there is no problem. But if the governmental point of
view is essentially a monopoly in the given speech market, then the
speech restrictions are problematic.63 The Court was probably right to
say that indigent clients rely solely on the government-funded lawyers
in making legal arguments, although if the indigent women in Rust
could get abortion-related advice from sources other than the
government-funded doctors, perhaps the clients in Velazquez could
get outside legal advice, as well. Or perhaps the indigent women in
Rust could not get such outside medical advice. These are difficult,
fact-specific determinations. The underlying focus-on the possible
monopoly power of government in some speech settings-is a good
one.
The first ground is an important consideration, but the Court makes
too much of it. In the setting of funding conditions, when the message
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 14.
60. See Greene, supra note 1, at 39-40.
61. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
62. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 75-
104 (1980).
63. See Greene, supra note 1, at 27-40.
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(or message prohibition) is clearly that of the government, citizens
know whom to blame and any virtues of government speech are
apparent. When the message (or message prohibition) is not clearly
that of the government, these attributes disappear. But the fact that
speech (or its restriction) may not be clearly attributable to
government should not, by itself, doom a conditional funding
program.' Here, it would certainly have been smoother had Congress
insisted that LSC-funded lawyers say to their clients, "while I'm
allowed to challenge the denial of welfare benefits or the amount of
the benefits, the U.S. Government won't allow me to challenge the
underlying law itself." Even without such disclosure, however, the
condition on funding nonetheless represents the government's speech
interest in the particular speech setting. Here, the government speech
interest is "no challenge to extant welfare law" and the speech setting
is "conditional funding of LSC lawyers."
The second ground for the Court's holding is the most far-reaching,
and almost certainly wrong. The Court states that Congress may not,
through funding conditions, "distort" the normal functioning of a type
of expression, here, lawyer-client speech. Clients expect their lawyers
to represent them vigorously and comprehensively; funding
restrictions that remove a weapon from a lawyer's arsenal alter that
traditional lawyer-client relationship. Descriptively, this is true. But
the Court is a long way from justifying its normative conclusion that
the alteration of the traditional lawyer-client relationship, via funding
conditions, is a ground for constitutional invalidation. Here, for the
first time in the caselaw, the Court has backed the Cole/Post
argument discussed above,6 namely, that government funding
conditions may not disrupt conventional speech relationships. As I
suggested earlier, however, this argument inappropriately privileges
the settled over the unsettled, and adopts a conventionalist
understanding of government's role in speech markets that does not
properly acknowledge the ways in which government may, through
funding, alter the nature of speech markets.' In other words,
bracketing the Carolene Products footnote 4 issue for the moment, we
should not construe the first amendment to prevent the government
from changing the nature of LSC representation if it so chooses, even
if we think such alteration awful as a matter of social policy. If LSC
lawyers are to be limited purpose lawyers, then that is what they are
to be. They would then be a certain type of government-funded
agent, and would be understood as such.
We must wait to see how far this aspect of Velazquez extends; the
case may well be limited, over time, to the legitimate Carolene
64. See id. at 49-52.
65. See supra, pages 1678-79.
66. See Greene, supra note 1, at 52-67.
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